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ARGUMENT 
The issues raised by the defendants can be briefly addressed. 
First, the defendants do not deny or dispute that State Farm, the liability 
insurance carrier for the property where the plaintiff fell, had notice of the claim well 
before any period of limitations ran. Although in Utah there is no direct right of action 
against the insurer on a liability claim, no one can dispute that State Farm is the primary 
party in interest in defending this action. 
Secondly, it is not accurate to describe the first action filed by the plaintiff in 
November, 1992, as "a nullity". The action was filed against "Willowcreek Plaza", 
which was both the name of the shopping plaza where the plaintiffs accident occurred, 
and also the name of the owner of the property at the time the lawsuit was filed. The 
property owner, Willowcreek Plaza, L.C., was served with the complaint. Although 
Judge Lewis dismissed the first action on the ground that Willowcreek Plaza, L.C. did 
not own the property at the time of the accident, this does not mean that the first action 
was a nullity, nor that it was filed against a non-existent entity. Likewise, although it 
was later determined that the actual owners of the property were not doing business in 
1992 under the name Willowcreek Plaza, it is clear from the complaint that it was 
plaintiffs intention to bring the action against the owners of the property, and they 
appeared to be doing business under that name. 
Therefore, the question is really whether under these peculiar circumstances the 
savings statute (assuming for the reasons set forth in the plaintiffs opening brief that it 
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allows for more than one refiling) permits the plaintiff to correct the name of the 
defendants in a subsequent refiling. 
Much of the authority cited by defendants is not helpful. For example, the Utah 
cases of Dunn v. Kelly. 675 P.2d 571 (Utah 1983) and Estate of Haro v. Haro. 887 P.2d 
878 (Utah Ct.App. 1994), along with several of the cases cited from other jurisdictions 
such as Brown v. Hartshorne Public Sch. Dist. No. 1. 926 F.2d 959 (10th Cir. 1981), 
involve cases in which an attempt was made to substitute one plaintiff for another in an 
action refiled under a savings statute. These cases hold that a party cannot take advantage 
of someone else's prior filing to invoke the savings statute. That issue is simply not 
presented by this case in which the plaintiff is the same, and the factual allegations and 
cause of action are identical. 
While there are cases which hold that it is not permissible to name a new 
defendant in an action to be filed under a savings statute, there are also cases which allow 
for such a joinder, and the only Utah case in which the situation arose appears to have 
permitted such an addition of a new party, Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 
1989). (See discussion at pages 8 through 10 of appellant's opening brief). In addition 
to the authorities cited in the opening brief, it is of interest that it has been held that when 
in an initial action an insurer was directly named, and in a second saved action the 
insured was named, such a substitution of parties was permitted by the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals applying Iowa law in Beilke v. Droz. 675 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1992). 
(The issue in Beilke was certified to the Supreme Court in Iowa which issued its opinion 
in Beilke v. Droz, 316 N.W.2d 912 (Iowa 1982) holding that if there is sufficient identity 
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of interest between the parties, or the change is merely nominal, one defendant may be 
substituted for another in a refiled action). It has also been held that when one defendant 
acquires the assets and liabilities of another, the purchaser can be substituted for the 
former owner mistakenly named pursuant to the Oklahoma saving statute, Clark v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 677 P.2d 1092 (Okla. App. 1984). See also, Producers 
Releasing Corp. v. Pithe Ind.. Inc.. 184 F.2d 1021 (2nd Cir. 1950). 
The important point is that under certain circumstances a substitution of 
defendants has been permitted by other courts in a refiled action, and the peculiar 
circumstances of this case warrant a reversal of the district court's dismissal of the 
complaint. At a minimum, the judgment of dismissal should be reversed and the case 
remanded for additional evidentiary review of the question whether there is sufficient 
identity of interest between the original named defendant and the presently named 
defendants to allow the action to go forward. 
CONCLUSION 
The order dismissing plaintiffs complaint should be reversed and remanded with 
an order allowing the case to go forward, or at a minimum, with instructions to the 
district court to take further evidence on the identity of interest between the original and 
substituted defendants. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of January, 1999. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
